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PUNITIVE DAMAGES-Mattyasovszky v. West
Towns Bus Co.-Punitive Damages Nonrecoverable
Under the Illinois Survival Act
As twelve year old Mattyas Mattyasovaszky Jr. left the bus's rear
door, he realized that he had exited at the wrong stop.' Attempting
to re-enter the bus, he grasped the closing doors and wedged his foot
between them. The bus lacked an outside right rearview mirror
through which the driver could see the struggling boy. Even more
dangerous, the alarm bell which normally sounded to warn the
driver when the rear doors were not fully closed was inoperable due
to corrosion. The driver started to move the vehicle; passengers
shouted for him to stop; he turned his head and slowed, but the bus
moved forward. Though the boy, in the meantime, had freed himself
from the door, he slipped beneath the rear wheels to his death.
The boy's father instituted a wrongful death action against the
driver and the West Towns Bus Company seeking both compensatory and punitive damages for the alleged negligence and willful and
wanton misconduct in the operation of the bus. At the close of the
plaintiff's case in chief, the driver was dismissed from the action.
Finding the boy free from contributory negligence and the bus company vicariously liable, the jury awarded the plaintiff $75,000 in
pecuniary damages and $50,000 in punitive damages. Three months
after the trial, the plaintiff was permitted to amend his complaint
to include a cause of action under the Illinois Survival Act,' as well
as a common law cause of action for wrongful death2
On appeal, the Appellate Court for the Second District affirmed
the plaintiff's recovery of pecuniary damages under the Illinois
Wrongful Death Act, but denied any recovery for punitive damages
under either the Wrongful Death or Survival Acts, and found no
basis for a common law action for wrongful death.4 Relying on the
recent decision of Baird v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R.
Co., 5 the court held that under the Wrongful Death Act punitive
damages are not recoverable.' The appellate court also determined
that the Survival Act's authorization of recovery of damages for an
1.
61 111.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 21111. App. 3d 46, 313 N.E.2d 496 (1974), a/f'd.,
2d 31, 330 N.E.2d 509 (1975).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 27-6 (1975), formerly ch. 3, § 339.
21 111. App. 3d at 48, 313 N.E.2d at 498.
Id. at 52, 313 N.E.2d at 503.
11 111. App. 3d 264, 296 N.E.2d 365 (1973).
21 111. App. 3d at 55, 313 N.E.2d at 502.
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injury to the person "clearly and unequivocally mean[t] damages
of a physical character" and since punitive damages are assessed
only to punish and deter the defendant's conduct, the court reasoned that punitive damages cannot be recovered in an action under
the Survival Act.7
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, but on
different grounds.' First, the court disposed of the appellant's claim
for punitive damages under the Survival Act by curtly noting that
the Survival Act had never before been thought to authorize an
award of punitive damages. The court then reiterated the appellate
court's determination that no common law action for wrongful
death exists in Illinois. Finally, the court supported its decision by
devoting a major portion of its opinion to a discussion of the intrinsic shortcomings of punitive damages.
Due to the interplay between punitive damages and the Illinois
Survival Act, the net effect of the supreme court's decision in
Mattyasovszky has been to make it "cheaper to kill your victim
than to leave him maimed." 9 This article will examine the roles
which punitive damages and the Survival Act play in Illinois tort
law. It will demonstrate that the appellate court's refusal to permit
the recovery of punitive damages in an action brought under the
Survival Act rests upon a faulty construction of that Act. And finally, it will show that the Illinois Supreme Court's affirmance
stands neither in law nor sound policy.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

English Developments
Punitive damages were first awarded in England in 1763 as a
result of outrage over the Crown's efforts to suppress the publication
of a paper called the North Briton. ° By nameless warrants, the
Secretary of State, Lord Halifax, directed government messengers
to seize the North Briton's printers and publishers. Though the
plaintiff in Huckle v. Money" was noted as having been treated
"very civilly with beef steakes and beer" during his six hour captivity, Lord Justice Wilmot allowed an award of exemplary damages
because the actions of the King's men in entering a man's house by
7. Id.
8. Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61 111. 2d 31, 330 N.E.2d 509 (1975).
9. 21 111. App. 3d at 54, 313 N.E.2d at 502.
10. H. MCGREGOR, McGREGOR ON DAMAGES 219 (13th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
McGREGOR1.

11.

95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763).
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a nameless warrant were a "daring public attack . . . upon the
liberty of a subject.... .. In an action brought by another victim
of the Crown's attack on the North Briton, Lord Chief Justice Pratt
explained the rationale for the awards:
Damages are designed not only as a satisfaction for the injured
person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from
any such proceeding for the future, and as proof of the detestation
of the jury to the action [of the defendant] itself. 3
By the end of the 1760's, awards of punitive damages had been made
in cases of non-governmental tortious conduct and the concept of
awarding a sum beyond mere compensation to punish and deter a
tortfeasor's outrageous conduct became firmly established in English law. 4
The practice of awarding punitive damages continued in England
until 1964 when the House of Lords determined that, but for a few
exceptions, it was no longer permissible to award punitive damages
against a defendant, no matter how outrageous his conduct."' Noting that the cases failed to disclose whether punitive or compensatory aims had triumphed, their Lordships ruled that henceforth the
punitive damages cases should be viewed as cases of aggravated
damages in which the plaintiff was awarded extra compensation for
the injury to his feelings and dignity. 6 Punitive damages may not
be awarded except where expressly authorized by statute; 7 in cases
of oppressive conduct by government servants;" and in cases where
a defendant's conduct was calculated by the defendant to make a
profit for himself exceeding compensatory damages to the plaintiff."
Punitive Damages in Illinois
In Illinois, the function of punitive damages has been variously
explained. The Illinois Supreme Court, in 1845, permitted a six
hundred and fifty dollar award of exemplary damages against the
client of an A. Lincoln "not only to compensate the plaintiff, but
to punish the defendant."2" While this formulation equalizes the
12.
13.
14.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498-99 (K.B. 1763).
McGREGOR, supra note 10, at 219.
Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129.
Id. at 1221.
McGREGOR, supra note 10, at 222.
Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129, 1226.
Id.
McNamara v. King, 7 Il1. (2 Gilm.) 432 (1845).
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compensatory and punitive functions of the doctrine, one commentator explains the development of the doctrine
as a means of reimbursing the plaintiff for elements of damage
which were not legally compensable, such as wounded feelings or
the expenses of suit.2
With the broadening of the concept of actual damage to include
intangible harm not previously compensable,22 the Illinois Supreme
Court in 1864 determined that in instances of wanton or willful
conduct the jury might give an amount of damages "beyond the
injury sustained, as a punishment, and to preserve the public tranquility."23 Thus, after initially characterizing punitive damages as
partially compensatory, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the
theory of awarding punitive damages solely to punish and deter the
defendant and others from committing like offenses in the future.
Punitive damages are awarded only for certain kinds of tortious
conduct. Not only must the defendant be guilty of some wrongful
conduct, but the "wrongful act must be characterized by circum"..."24
On a scale ranging from simple
stances of aggravation .
to
malicious
intentional
acts, punitive damage
passive negligence
liability is currently imposed in Illinois only for tortfeasor conduct
which can be characterized as at least "willful and wanton."2
Despite its salutory purposes of punishment and deterrence, the
concept of punitive damages has always been a burr under the judicial saddle. As Chief Justice Ryan of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
stated in 1877:
It is difficult on principle to understand why, when the sufferer by
a tort has been fully compensated for his suffering, he should recover anything more. And it is equally difficult to understand why,
if the tortfeasor is to be punished by exemplary damages, they
should go to the compensated sufferer, and not to the public in
whose behalf he is punished. The reasons against punitory damages are peculiarly applicable in this state [because of] the just
and broad rule of compensatory damage sanctioned by this
court .
2.
21. J. Ghiardi, Should Punitive Damages be Abolished?-A Statement for the Affirmative, 11964-651 ABA SECTION OF INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAW PROCEEDINGS
282, 283 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Ghiardi].
22. See Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REv. 517, 520 (1957).
23. Hawk v. Ridgeway, 33 Ill.
473, 476 (1864). See also Foote v. Nichols, 28 II. 486 (1862).
192, 197, 131 N.E. 675, 677 (1921).
24. Eshelman v. Rawalt, 298 Ill.
25. 61 Ill.
2d at 35, 330 N.E. 2d at 511.
26. Bass v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 654, 672 (1877).
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Similar expressions of regret over the adoption of punitive damages
can be found in Illinois cases dating back to 1872.7 Over the years,
the arguments lodged against punitive damage awards have included: the superiority of the criminal system to impose punishment;2" the undeserved windfall to the plaintiff;" the financial
interest of the plaintiff in the highest, but not necessarily the most
appropriate award;30 the role of the inexperienced jury in the delicate task of assessing punitive damages;3 the anachronistic and
anomalistic aspects of the punitive damages concept;32 and the lack
of understanding of the economic impact of damage awards in general. 3 Despite these criticisms, the Illinois Supreme Court has sustained the doctrine of punitive damages because it is "too firmly
rooted in our jurisprudence to be disturbed."34 As the court noted
more than a century ago, any initiative to unearth this firmly rooted
doctrine must come from the legislature.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ILLINOIS SURVIVAL ACT
31
Like the doctrine of punitive damages, the Illinois Survival Act
traces its roots to the English common law. Dating from at least the
17th century, the common law rule of abatement held that "personal actions die with the person. '37 Under this rule, not only the
claims of a person against others, but also the claims of others
against him abate upon his death. Though the original justification
has disappeared into the mists of history, one explanation for the

27. See, e.g., Eshelman v. Rawalt, 298 Ill. 192, 131 N.E. 675 (1921); Meidel v. Anthis, 71
11. 241 (1874); Holmes v. Holmes, 64 Ill. 294 (1872).
28. See Ghiardi, supra note 21, at 287.
29. 61 111. 2d at 36, 330 N.E. 2d at 511.
30. See Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1931).
31. See, e.g., Ghiardi, supra note 21.
32. Id. at 285.
33. See Nordstorm, Damages as Compensation for Loss, 5 N. CAROLINA CENTRAL L.J. 15
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Nordstrom].
34. Holmes v. Holmes, 64 Ill. 294, 298 (1872).
35. Ously v. Hardin, 23 Ill. 352, 354 (1860). However, the Illinois General Assembly has
acted to ban punitive damage awards in several specific actions: in actions by an injured
party against a local public entity, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-102 (1975); in an action for
alienation of affections, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 36 (1975); in an action for breach of promise
to marry, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 89, § 27 (1975); and in an action for criminal conversation,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 43 (1975).
On the other hand, the legislature has authorized an award of punitive damages in: actions
brought against eavesdroppers, or landlords, building owners or operators, or common carriers
by wire who aid in eavesdropping activities, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 14-6 (1975); and actions
against persons who fraudulently obtain state aid. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-21 (1975).
36. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 27-6 (1975).
37. Oppenheim, The Survival of Tort Actions and the Action for Wrongful Death-A
Survey and a Proposal, 16 TULANE L. REv. 386 (1942).
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rule is that since actions ex delicto were thought to be substitutes
for private war, they might be thought incapable of continuation on
behalf of a decedent who could not be appeased."
Today the maxim "personal actions die with the person,"
expresses two separate common law notions: the original common
law idea barring personal actions after a person's death; and the
relatively recent idea that the common law does not recognize the
death of a human being as giving rise to a cause of action in a third
39
person injured by that death.
In Illinois, the common law rule of abatement has been interpreted as calling for the suspension of all proceedings in a suit at
law upon the death of the plaintiff.4 0 Thus, at common law, tort
actions, whether created by common law or statute, do not survive
a person's death utless they are declared to survive by a statutory
provision.4 Exceptions to the common law rule of abatement exist.
For example, contract actions have always been thought to survive
on the theory that contractual rights are not so personal as to abate
upon death. Similary, actions to enforce equitable remedies also
survive .13
In 1872, the Illinois legislative response was to enact a statute
creating certain exceptions to the rule of abatement, rather than its
outright ban.4 The Illinois Survival Act provides:
In addition to the actions which survive by the common law, the
following also survive: actions of replevin, actions to recover damages for an injury to the person (except slander and libel), actions
to recover damages for an injury to real or personal property or for
the detention or conversion of personal property, actions against
officers for misfeasance, malfeasance or nonfeasance of themselves
or their deputies, actions for fraud or deceit, and actions provided
in Section 14 of Article VI of "An act relating to alcoholic
liquors."'"
Thus, under the Survival Act, only those actions which survive by
the common law, such as contract actions and actions to enforce
38.
39.

See generally F. POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTs 62-65 (13th ed. 1929).
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 901 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as

PROSSER].

40. Davis v. Moore, 103 Ill.
445 (1882).
41. Creighton v. Pope County, 386 Ill.
468, 54 N.E.2d 543 (1944).
42. See, e.g., Estate of Rapp v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 113 Ill.
390 (1885); Butterman v. Chamales, 73 Il1. App. 2d 399, 220 N.E.2d 81 (1966).
43. Edgerton v.Johnson, 178 F.2d 106 (7th Cir. 1950).
44. For a collection of other states' statutory solutions to the rule of abatement see S.
SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH

45.

ILL.

REV. STAT.

(2d ed. 1975).

ch. 3, § 27-6 (1975).
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equitable remedies, and those actions within the seven categories
delineated in the statute survive; all other actions are held to
abate.4
Though the Illinois legislature unfortunately left no statutory history behind to indicate its intent in enacting the Survival Act, indications of its probable intent can be gathered from the legal context
of the rule of abatement and the statute itself. When a person dies,
society must deal with the problem of resettling the various economic rights and liabilities which the person acquired in his lifetime.47 The common law solution was abatement: all rights of action
for and against the person, with few exceptions, were suspended.
The Illinois legislature determined in 1872, that at least as to certain
of these economic rights and liabilities, abatement was no longer
satisfactory. Its solution was the survival of actions: upon the death
of a person, particular economic rights and liabilities of the decedent passed to his estate to be exercised or enforced as if he were
still alive. In effect, the Illinois Survival Act puts the representative
of the deceased into the shoes of the decedent for certain causes of
action.
Much confusion flourishes in the legal community regarding the
purposes and effects of the Survival Act and the Wrongful Death
Act. This confusion was generated when one shorthand expression
of the common law rule of abatement, "personal actions die with the
person," was used to describe those two distinct common law notions: the first, that upon the death of either party an ex delicto
cause of action abates; the second, that the death of a human being
does not give rise to a cause of action in third persons.48 The Illinois
legislature enacted the Wrongful Death Act in 1853 to alter the
second common law notion by providing a cause of action to the
heirs of a decedent for their pecuniary loss resulting from the death.
The legislature enacted the Survival Act in 1872 to vary the first
common law notion by providing for the continuation, after death,
of certain causes of action acquired during a person's life. As the
supreme court noted in Murphy v. Martin Oil Co., "[tihe statutes
are conceptually separate and different."49 While the plaintiff in a
46. Prior to the enactment of the Survival Act, the General Assembly enacted the Wrongful Death Act which created a cause of action in designated heirs of the victim for their
pecuniary loss suffered as a result of the death. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 1 et seq. (1975).
47. See generally 3 Califonia Law Revision Comm'n, Survival of Actions, F-6, F-7 (1961)
cited in McClelland and Truett, Survival of Punitive Damages in Wrongful Death Cases, 8
U. SAN FAN. L. REv. 585, 593 (1974) [hereinafter cited as McClelland and Truettl.
48. McClelland and Truett, supra note 47, at 585.
49. 56 IIl. 2d 423, 431, 308 N.E.2d 583, 586-87 (1974).
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wrongful death action sues in his own right to redress the pecuniary
injury he has suffered because of the death of another, the plaintiff
in an action brought under the Survival Act sues in place of the
decedent to redress the injury which the decedent suffered before his
death. The Wrongful Death Act creates one cause of action upon
death; the Survival Act continues several causes of action after
death.
THE APPELLATE COURT'S DECISION

In Mattyasovszky, the appellate court disallowed the award of
punitive damages based upon a statutory construction of the Survival Act. In analyzing the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages in
an action brought under the Survival Act, the court pointed out that
to allow punitive damages "would once and for all put to rest the
old adage that it is cheaper to kill your victim than to leave him
maimed.""0 The court noted that "[d]espite our highest desires
• . . law is not always based upon logical rationale,"'" and determined that the law could not support an award of punitive damages
in an action brought under the Survival Act.5" It seems, however,
that the court's chagrin was needless, because the policies underlying the Survival Act, the cases interpreting it, and the language of
the Act itself compel a different conclusion.
The court commenced its analysis of the Survival Act with the
observation that
[t]he survival action for damages for injury to the person is a
creature of statute and the intent
of the legislature, as expressed
53
in the statute, is controlling.
Thus was planted the seed of a fatal error of statutory construction.
The Survival Act does not provide a "survival action for damages"
for personal injuries, but rather it permits the survival of "actions
to recover damages" for a personal injury." This lilliputian juxtaposition of words causes a herculean shift of legal principle. It erroneously substitutes the theory of the Wrongful Death Act, which
created a statutorily prescribed remedy for which the common law
provided none, in place of the theory of the Survival Act, which
preserves those causes of action that the deceased acquired during
his life. The Survival Act does not create any new "creature of
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

21 1M. App. 3d at 54,
Id.
Id. at 55, 313 N.E.2d
Id. at 54, 313 N.E.2d
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3,

313 N.E.2d at 502.
at 502.
at 502.
§ 27-6 (1975).
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statute" as the court suggests; instead, it preserves those old species
with which we are already familiar.
Decisions in Illinois have long recognized that the Survival Act
does not create some different cause of action.5 5 In an 1887 suit for
personal injuries which was brought under the Survival Act, the
court stated
there may be a recovery, notwithstanding the death, for precisely
could have recovered for,
the same injuries that the party himself
6
had he lived until after the final trial.
Surely this can mean nothing other than that the same cause of
action for personal injuries which the deceased acquired prior to his
death passes through the barrier of abatement erected upon his
death. Just as surely, the court's conception that once on the other
side of that barrier, the Survival Act somehow transforms the cause
of action into something different, is fallacious.
Mistakenly proceeding upon the theory that the Survival Act
creates some new action called a "survival action," the court, citing
57 determined that
Shedd v. Patterson,
[t]he words "damages for injury to the person" clearly and unequivocally mean damages of a physical character."
The court's rendition of the language suggests a limitation of the
remedies which the Survival Act affords. "Clearly and unequivocally," however, the question of the character of damages recoverable in an action brought under the Survival Act is a false issue.
First, the proper version of the statutory language is "damages for
an injury to the person."5 9 The presence of this article is crucial
because it gives the statutory words a different meaning than that
given by the court. The court's rendering "damages for injury to the
person," as opposed to "damages for an injury to the person," allowed the court to interpret the statute as limiting the character of
damages recoverable. While the court's interpretation may be correct in light of its version of the Survival Act, such is not a correct
interpretation of the Survival Act drafted by the General Assembly.
The Survival Act provides only for the survival of certain causes of
55. Prouty v. City of Chicago, 250 Ill. 222, 95 N.E. 147 (1911); Chicago and Eastern Illinois
Railroad Co. v. O'Connor, 119 Ill. 586, 9 N.E. 263 (1887); Holton v. Daly, 106 I1. 131 (1882);
Genslinger v. New Illinois Athletic Club, 229 Ill. App. 428 (1923); Wetherell v. Chicago City
R.R. Co., 104 Ill. App. 357 (1902).
56. Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad Co. v. O'Connor, 119 11. 586, 594 (1887).
57. 230 Ill. App. 553 (1923), aff'd., 312 Ill. 371, 144 N.E. 5 (1924).
58. 21 111. App. 3d at 54, 313 N.E.2d at 502 (1974).
59. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 27-6 (1975) (emphasis added).
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action; it does not attempt to answer the entirely separate question
of the measure of compensation provided. 0
Secondly, the court's reference to Shedd v. Pattersononly magnifies its error. The issue in Shedd was whether an action for malicious
prosecution was an action "to recover damages for an injury to the
person."'" The court in Shedd held that an action for damages for
an injury to the person contemplates an action involving "damages
or injury of a physical character," and since an action for malicious
prosecution does not involve damages or injury of a physical character, an action for malicious prosecution does not survive under the
Survival Act. 2 The Mattyasovszky court's reliance on Shedd unknowingly depends upon an ambiguity in the term "damages." In
Shedd, "damages" denoted a physical injury, and the court determined only that the injury caused by malicious prosecution is not
an injury of a physical character. 3 Plainly, Shedd cannot be cited
for the proposition that only certain kinds of money damages are
recoverable under the Survival Act. Since the question in
Mattyasovszky did not involve the nature of the injury, but rather
recoverable compensation, the court's reliance on Shedd is misplaced. Indeed, Shedd's determination that "actions to recover
damages for an injury to the person" characterizes a certain type of
action, precludes the appellate court's coloration of that same language as a limitation of a remedy.
Thirdly, the court's reasoning that the provisions of the Survival
Act limit the remedy which the Act provides in regard to personal
injury actions opens a veritable Pandora's box of Survival Act construction. Since the Survival Act specifies no remedy in survival
actions for fraud or replevin or for an officer's misfeasance, it is fair
to say that the question of what remedies were to be made available
in these actions brought under the Survival Act is one which never
concerned the legislators. And if the question of the remedies available in these actions did not concern the legislators, it is reasonable
to assume that the question of the remedies available in actions for
injury to person or property did not concern them either. But even
if the question of the remedies available in actions for injury to
person or property did concern them, then why did the legislators
adopt such an ambiguous statutory formulation and contextual
locus for these unusual limiting provisions? Could it not simply be
60.
61.
62.
63.

497, 196 N.E. 497 (1935).
See generally Geiger v. Merle, 360 Ill.
230 I1. App. at 556.
Id. at 557.
Shedd v. Patterson, 312 Il1. 371, 374, 144 N.E. 5, 6 (1924).
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that the legislators unfortunately mentioned the ambiguous word
"damages" only in hopes of avoiding the ambiguity which a provision for the survival of "actions for an injury to the person" would
create?
Through the misperception of the theory of the Survival Act, the
omission of a statutory word, the equivocation of some case
language, and a narrow perspective of the Survival Act's provisions,
the appellate court constructed a barrier to the recovery of punitive
damages in an action brought under the Survival Act which does not
exist. Since the Survival Act contains no proscription on the recovery of punitive damages, it follows that in appropriate circumstances such a recovery should be permitted.
Certainly there are compelling reasons for allowing the recovery
of punitive damages in an action brought under the Survival Act.
There can be no dispute but that the legislative intent was to terminate the operation of the rule of abatement in the seven actions
mentioned in the Act. Moreover, the Act has been described on
several occasions as being remedial in character and calling for a
liberal construction. 4 Clearly, the appellate court's construction
which imposes a partial "abatement" on the remedy cannot be said
to be liberal. If the statement that the Act is to be construed liberally is not to be merely an empty formalism, it can only mean that
the Act preserves entirely a specified cause of action which the
decedent could have maintained had he lived, including the full
measure of recovery.
The experience of other states only serves to reinforce the conclusion that no limitation on the recovery of punitive damages can be
found in the Survival Act.65 In 1972, the Maryland Court of Appeals
declared
[the rationale for precluding exemplary damages in wrongful
death actions - that the statute creating the cause of action limits
the recoverable damages - has no application to an action
brought by the personal representative, which is not a new cause
64. See, e.g., Devine v. Healy, 241 Ill. 34, 89 N.E. 251 (1909); Northern Trust Co. v.
Palmer, 171 Ill. 383, 49 N.E. 553 (1898).
65. Numerous states allow recovery of punitive damages in actions brought under their
survival acts. See, e.g., Oilier v. Lake Central Airlines, Inc., 423 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1970)
(Ohio); Hennigan v. Atlantic Refining Co., 282 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Pa.), aft'd, 400 F.2d 857
(3d Cir. 1968); Leahy v. Morgan, 275 F. Supp. 424 (E.D. Iowa 1967); Reynolds v. Willis, 209
A.2d 760 (Del. 1965); Atlas Properties, Inc. v. Didich, 226 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1969); Smith v.
Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972); Thornton v. Ins. Co. of North
America, 287 So. 2d 262 (Miss. 1973); State ex rel. Smith v. Greene, 494 S.W.2d 55 (Mo.
1973); Kern v. Kogan, 93 N.J. Super. 459, 226 A.2d 186 (1967); Worrie v. Boze, 198 Va. 891,

96 S.E.2d 799 (1957).
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of action at all, but one which the decedent could have maintained
had he lived."
If, while alive, a person could have recovered punitive damages
in one of the actions preserved under the Survival Act, it follows
that his representative should be able to recover punitive damages
when that same action is brought under the Act.
THE SUPREME COURT OPINION

The supreme court concurred in the appellate court's determination that the Survival Act does not authorize the recovery of
punitive damages, but it reached its conclusion on an entirely different rationale. In essence, the court reasoned that punitive damages
should not be awarded under the Survival Act because no Illinois
case has ever allowed such an award. 7 This rationale is unconvincing. The unvarnished fact is that the issue of whether punitive damages may be recovered in an action brought under the Survival Act
has never been decided in any Illinois case. Indeed, it may be said
with equal persuasiveness that in the absence of a judicial prohibition against the recovery of punitive damages in an action brought
under the Act, the Act imposes no ban on their recovery.
From the absence of an analysis of the Survival Act and the
presence of criticism of the punitive damages concept, it is clear
that the court's decision was grounded in opposition to the punitive
damages principle itself, rather than any limitation inherent in the
Survival Act. Recognizing that the punitive and deterrent objectives of punitive damages overlap with the objectives of the criminal
law, the supreme court objected to the punitive damages principle
because it contains none of the safeguards of the criminal law which
insure that only punitive and deterrent objectives are achieved.
Where the criminal law insists upon clearly defined conduct, fixed
penalties, and the forfeiture of any fine to the state, the law of
punitive damages permits the imposition of punishment for a rather
unspecified range of conduct, in any amount which the jury opts,
and places the fine into the pocket of the plaintiff. To punish and
to deter, the criminal law, with its experience in dealing with wrongdoers, its flexibility in sentencing, and its staff of experts is superior
to the civil law's device of punitive damages.68 Furthermore, if the
defendant is to be punished for his conduct he should be accorded
66.
67.
68.

Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 158-59, 297 A.2d 721, 727 (1972).
61 111. 2d at 36, 330 N.E.2d at 510.
Ghiardi, supra note 21, at 287.
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the protections which our system gives to those subject to criminal
punishment.9
An objection to punitive damages mentioned by the court in
Mattyasovszky,70 and advanced by Chief Justice Ryan nearly one
hundred years before,7 ' is that an award of punitive damages exacted from the defendant is nothing more than a windfall to the
plaintiff. Indeed, punitive damages are society's gift to "lucky"
plaintiffs." The aim of tort compensation is to compensate the
plaintiff for his loss; yet, fully compensated, the plaintiff in a punitive damages case is allowed to recover an additional sum in the
name of society merely because the effects of the defendant's misconduct were inauspiciously visited upon the plaintiff.
Finally, the court objected to application of the punitive damages
principle where liability is imposed only vicariously. Although
punitive damages may be imposed in Illinois when the wrongful act
of the agent is perpetrated while obstensibly discharging duties
within the scope of corporate purposes,74 the practice is questioned
because of the dangers of jury confusion regarding the purposes of
the award.7" Where the employer directly contributes to the employee's tortious conduct, assessment of punitive damages to punish
the employer and to deter the employer and others is appropriate.
Where the employer is blameless punitive damages obviously can
not serve to punish or deter the employer. The danger is that the
69. One commentator has concluded that most criminal procedural safeguards are unnecessary in punitive damages cases, but has recommended the adoption of a higher standard
of proof and a protection against double jeopardy. Note, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 408 (1966).
70. 61 111. 2d at 36, 330 N.E.2d at 511.
71. Bass v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 654, 672 (1877).
72. This is seen by some commentators as a selling point of punitive damages. The
existence of punitive damages provides a suitable incentive for the punishment of minor
criminal acts which are overlooked by a police force already overburdened with the problems
of more serious crime. See, e.g., D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 205
(1973).

73. 61 111. 2d at 36, 330 N.E.2d at 512.
74. See, e.g., Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Holdfodt, 86 111.455 (1877); Chicago, Rock
Island & Peoria R.R. Co. v. Herring, 57 Ill. 59 (1870).
75. See Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1931)
Ihereinafter cited as Morris].
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217 c (1958) provides that:
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other principal
because of an act by an agent if, but only if:
(a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the
scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved the
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jury is likely to consider not the amount of financial loss, if any,
which will cause the employer to control his employees, but rather
the amount of such loss which is necessary to punish and deter the
employee from his tortious conduct."
While the supreme court aimed its critique of punitive damages
to the overlap between the criminal law and the civil law, the windfall to the plaintiff, and the problem of vicarious liability, the
court's discussion suggests that other unarticulated criticisms of the
punitive damages principle may have influenced its decision. The
court seems acutely aware of the dangers of the overzealous plaintiff: for the self-interest which initially leads the plaintiff to seek
punitive damages in the name of society, may ultimately obscure
legitimate societal interests in the evenhanded punishment and
deterrence of wrongdoers. As Professor Morris notes:
The plaintiff in a punitive damage case not only profits by securing
the admonition of the defendant; he profits more by heavy punishment than by light. So it would not be surprising if plaintiffs in
punitive damage cases attempted to . . . influence juries to give
high awards [having] little or no bearing on the proper admoni78
tion of defendants.
Tightly reigned, the plaintiffs self-interest coincides with societal
interests in the control of its valuable, but potentially harmful activities; uncontrolled, the plaintiff's self-interest tends not toward
the management of valuable social activities, but toward their annihilation.
The overzealous plaintiff's insensitive adversary poses a different
problem with regard to an award of punitive damages. Supporters
of the punitive damages principle counter criticism that punitive
damages verdicts are excessive by pointing out that large punitive
awards are sometimes necessary to effectively deal with corporate
tortfeasors. 7' The conclusion which can safely be drawn from both
of these observations is that a proper assessment of punitive
damages encompasses difficult problems which require skill and
detachment for effective solution. Judicial acquaintance with both
the delicacy of the punitive damages judgment and the jury's inexperience in fixing penalties could single-handedly account for the
77. See generally Note, The Assessment of Punitive Damages Against an Entrepreneur
For The Malicious Torts Of His Employees, 70 YALE L.J. 1296 (1961).
78. Morris, supra note 75, at 1178.
79. P. Corboy, Should Punitive Damages be Abolished?-A Statement for the Negative,
[1964-65], ABA SECTION OF INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAW PROCEEDINGS 292,
298 (1965).
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judicial observation that "exemplary damages are not a favorite.""
Still another factor which may have influenced the supreme court
against punitive damages is a recognition that the practice is anachronistic. When punitive damages were first introduced into Illinois,
an unspoken justification for such awards was to compensate the
plaintiff for injuries which the law did not recognize as a component
of actual damages. In later years, the notion of actual damages was
expanded to include non-tangible losses such as mental suffering,
and consequently, the compensatory function of. punitive damages
was formally abandoned."' However, more than one of the Justices
on the supreme court may share Lord Devlin's concern that
[wihen one examines the cases in which large damages have been
awarded for conduct of this sort, it is not at all easy to say whether
the idea of compensation or the idea of punishment has prevailed. 2
Although awarding punitive damages solely to punish and deter has
continued in Illinois for over one hundred years, apparently, so have
judicial doubts that courtroom theory and juryroom practice are
widely disparate.
Another potential source of judicial concern over the punitive
damages principle is the notion that the practice is an anomaly. The
inexperience of the civil jury in meting out punishment and the
emotional atmosphere of the courtroom have led some critics to
suggest that for practical reasons, as well as for reasons of conceptual symmetry, the practice of assessing punitive damages should
be eliminated. 3
A final source of judicial uneasiness regarding punitive damages
may be the dearth of critical analysis devoted to the effects of damage awards in general.
Too often lawyers and judges . . . have devoted their time and
attention to the substantive rules of liability, leaving the recovery
to rest on a myriad of assumptions built on further untested
assumptions."
One can sense from the court's discussion of punitive damages in
Mattyasovszky an awareness that the indiscriminate use of punitive
damages "can produce arbitrary results in an area where sound
economic policy is needed," ' and a desire to slow the large-scale
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

City of Chicago v. Shayne, 46 Il. App. 2d 33, 38, 196 N.E.2d 521, 524 (1964).
See, e.g., Prouty v. City of Chicago, 250 I1. 222 (1911).
Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129, 1221.
Ghiardi, supra note 21, at 285.
Nordstrom, supra note 33, at 34-35.
Id. at 35.
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transfer of wealth in punitive damage awards until the impact of
such transfers is better understood.
In summary, while it is fair to say that in Illinois today punitive
damages are in theory assessed to punish and to deter, it must also
be said that judicial uncertainties concerning the ability of the punitive award to achieve either of these goals abound. Certainly, the
punishment function of punitive damages can best be effected in the
criminal, not the civil courts. The deterrent function, on the other
hand, is easily obfuscated by the plaintiff's financial interests. Despite such criticism, punitive damages continue to be awarded in
Illinois courts, not on the inherent strength of the punitive damages
principle, but on the strength of precedent.
THE

NEED TO ABANDON THE MATTYASOVSZKY RULE

Notwithstanding the many infirmities of the punitive damages
principle, the Illinois Supreme Court's refusal to permit the recovery of punitive damages in an action brought under the Survival Act
is unsatisfactory. While much may be said against allowing punitive
damages in any action, much more may be said against permitting
punitive damages in some actions but balking at such a recovery in
those same actions when the victim of the tortious conduct dies. The
case against restricting a recovery of punitive damages on the inauspicious death of the victim invokes a litany of error in both legal
theory and social policy.
The primary reason such a result is improper is that the Survival
Act does not call for the prohibition of punitive damages in an
action brought under its provisions. The Survival Act merely calls
for the preservation of certain causes of action; it says nothing about
the remedial measures available to deal with violated rights. In the
absence of a contrary expression of legislative intent, the same types
of recovery available in the enumerated actions must be available
when those actions are brought under the Survival Act.
A refusal to allow recovery of punitive damages in an action
brought under the Survival Act ignores the intent of the legislature
in enacting the Survival Act. Plainly, the Illinois General Assembly
intended to interrupt the operation of the common law rule of abatement as to certain causes of action. With the rule of abatement
neutralized as to the causes of action mentioned in the Survival Act,
the personal representative steps into the shoes of the deceased and
should recover exactly what the deceased would have recovered had
he lived. To permit the personal representative to recover compensatory damages while refusing to permit him to recover punitive
damages is to permit the personal representative to step into only
one of the decedent's shoes.
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The court's rationale that the Survival Act has never been
thought to authorize an award of punitive damages suggests that
the court believed that if the legislature were authorizing punitive
damages when it enacted the Survival Act, it would have said so.
An examination of the historical context surrounding the enactment
of the Survival Act suggests that just the opposite inference should
be made. By 1872, the weaknesses of the punitive damages principle
were well-known,'8 and at least twelve years earlier, Mr. Justice
Breese had put the legislature on notice that despite the flaws of the
punitive damages principle, the Illinois Supreme Court would respect it because "[i]f it be a bad rule, or unjust, it is competent
for the legislature to change it.""7 Thus, when the legislators enacted
a statute calling for the survival of certain kinds of actions, they
were fully aware of not only the defects inherent in one of the available remedial measures, but also of the intention of the supreme
court to enforce that remedial measure. Since no restriction on the
availability of punitive damages was enacted, either generally or
specifically in relation to actions brought under the Survival Act,
punitive damages cannot be said to have been excluded from the
range of remedial measures available in actions preserved under the
Act.
Furthermore, the refusal to allow the recovery of punitive damages in an action brought under the Survival Act frustrates the
purposes of awarding punitive damages. As has been demonstrated
in this article, punitive damages are in theory assessed because the
enormity of the defendant's offense demands punishment and deterrence. In line with this theory, society's concern is only with the
wrongdoer's conduct; whether the wrongdoer or his victim subsequently dies is irrelevant to society's asserted goals of punishment
and deterrence. Surely, the effectiveness of punitive damages as a
means of punishing and deterring the most aggravated tortious conduct is paralyzed when the willful and wanton tortfeasor who injures
his victim is mulcted in punitive damages, while the willful and
wanton tortfeasor who kills his victim is not.
One factor which may have weighed against allowing the the recovery of punitive damages in an action brought under the Survival
Act is the belief that to do so might circumvent the recovery limitaSee Holmes v. Holmes, 64 Ill.
294 (1872).
Ously v. Hardin, 23 Ill. 352, 354 (1860).
Damages in a Wrongful Death action are limited to:
a fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting
from such death ...
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1975).
86.
87.
88.
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tion imposed by the Wrongful Death Act. Once again, the confusion
between the Wrongful Death Act and the Survival Act has obscured
the aim of the Survival Act. In a wrongful death action, the claim
of the statutorily designated plaintiff is for the pecuniary injury he
has suffered as a result of the death. In an action under the Survival
Act, the claim of the plaintiff is for the injury which the deceased
sustained before his death. Damages under the Wrongful Death Act
are measured from the point of death; damages in an action under
the Survival Act are measured until the point of death.89 The only
common factor between a Wrongful Death action and an action
brought under the Survival Act may be that the death resulted from
the same tortious act. The causes of action are entirely different: the
suits are brought by legally different persons; and the damages are
recovered upon different theories and distributed by different channels. 0 Any recovery of any kind in an action brought under the
Survival Act does not circumvent the recovery limitation of the
Wrongful Death Act.
Perhaps the supreme court refused to allow recovery of punitive
damages in an action brought under the Survival Act for fear that
to do so would provoke a flood of punitive damages litigation. Such
a fear would be truly groundless for the simple reason that in the
great majority of cases, nothing close to the necessary standard of
willful and wanton conduct will be demonstrated. And where the
willful and wanton conduct of the defendant has been demonstrated, why should the death of one of the parties affect the defendant's liability for punitive damages?
Finally, the refusal to permit the recovery of punitive damages in
an action brought under the Survival Act stalls the modem trend
in Illinois toward imposing upon the wrongdoer full liability for his
tortious acts, as espoused by the court in Murphy v. Martin Oil Co.9
Although the recovery of punitive damages in an action brought
under the Survival Act gives a windfall to the estate of the decedent,
refusal to award punitive damages in such a situation brings a windfall savings to the defendant. In a state committed in its constitu89. PROSSER, supra note 39, at 906.
90. A recovery under the Wrongful Death Act is distributed directly to the statutorily
designated plaintiffs. A recovery under the Survival Act is distributed to the decedent's estate
and is subject to taxes and the claims of the decedent's creditors, among others, before
passing according to the decedent's will or by the intestate succession provisions. See Ohnesorge v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 259 Ill. 424, 102 N.E. 819 (1913); PROSSER, supra note 39, at
905.
91. Murphy v. Martin Oil Co., 56 Ill. 2d 423, 308 N.E.2d 583 (1974).
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tion to "the health, safety, and welfare of the people,""2 to reward
willful and wanton conduct resulting in death is simply intolerable.
SUMMARY

Faced with the unhappy choice of either extending an unsound
legal concept into a logical but hitherto unknown application, or
eliminating a powerful, but flawed incentive for the protection of
life, the Illinois Supreme Court in Mattyasovszky v. West Towns
Bus Co. chose the greater of two evils. However badly punitive
damages accomplish their theoretical goals of punishment and deterrence, changes in the application of the doctrine are to be made
by the General Assembly, as the supreme court itself has long noted.
Although the Illinois Supreme Court's well-reasoned and longstanding antipathy towards the punitive damages principle may explain
the court's decision in Mattyasovszky, it cannot justify that decision. In any action an award of punitive damages suffers from the
same flaws. To disallow the recovery of punitive damages merely
because the action is brought under the Survival Act is logically
inconsistent, statutorily unnecessary, and socially unprotective.
DANIEL
92.
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